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Summary 
The paper summarizes the principles of the fault tolerant control of the remote PCM 
switching system. PRS. After a brief introduction of the system, we deal with the standby 
strategies in the two main functional units (PRC and PRT) each of them having their own control 
system, mentioning also the fault detection methods. The last part treats the most important 
components of the diagnostic software. 
General System Description 
The purpose of the microprocessor controlled PCM remote switching 
system (PRS) is to extend local crossbar telephone exchanges type ARF 102, 
requiring a small installation space. Applying this system, a subscriber stage of 
1000 lines may be remoted in an ARF type office. The PRS is connected to the 
junction circuit groups SR of the crossbar exchange to handling originate calls 
and to the output terminals of the second group selector stage GV-II for 
terminating calls [1]. 
The whole system is built up of three types of equipment as follows: 
- subscriber terminal PRT, 
- switching and controlling equipment PRC and 
- ARF exchange interface PRA. 
The interconnections between these types of equipment and the layout of the 
PCM remote switching system is shown in Fig.!. PRTs are installed near the 
subscribers, but PRAs are operated in the building of the ARF -type crossbar-
exchange. PRC may be installed in a remote place and may also be operated in 
the same building together with PRAs. 
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The central control of the system (PCC) with stored program and the 
PCM switching system (PSN) for switching also conference cal1s are located in 
PRC. PRT and PRA are remotely control1ed by PCC through signalling 
channels of the PCM highways [1]. PRTs operate as intel1igent terminals 
containing controller processors, while PRAs are not provided with any 
intelligence. These latter ones execute the instructions received through their 
signal1ing channel without any decision making and directly transmit through 
the same channel the signals of the crossbar exchange. 
All the hardware units of PRS being common for at least 64 subscriber 
lines are operated with stand by, but the standby structure is not the same type 
in different hardware units. A system equipped with adequate standby units is 
able to operate correctly with a single error existing for a long time in its 
hardware, while the traffic handling capacity of the system could be 
deteriorated if some given types of error occur. 
Designing the fault tolerant structure and the reconfiguration strategy of 
the system, the following principle was taken into consideration: the most 
important requirement for the operation of a telephone exchange is not to 
switch through the calls without errors, but to maintain the operability of the 
exchange every time. This principle involves even an acceptance of faulty 
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interconnections in the case of transient errors occurring and having recorded 
the faults the system is permitted to continue operating in the same 
configuration without any intervention of the maintenance system. This is 
possible, because even in a switching system operating without any hardware 
errors, 15 percent of the calls are unsuccessful due to the busy line of subscribers 
that had been dialed and the number of misconnections due to these transient 
errors of hardware operations will be considerably less, hence practically 
negligible. An intervention of the maintenance system is required if the error of 
hardware operations may be considered as a permanent fault and if it is 
probably impossible to maintain the operability of the system without any 
reconfiguration. 
The procedures and hardware elements required for the fault detection 
and analysis as well as for reconfiguration of a faulty system are designed to be 
as simple as possible so as to avoid the procedures and hardware units to be 
more complicated than those under supervision and reconfiguration. It was 
supposed that the system would operate correctly for a long time and to 
operate any stand by units would be necessary seldom only. 
Fault detection and recovery strategies in PRG 
The fault detection elements indicate any defects occurring in the PCM 
switch or in any functional subunits of the control unit (CU). Continuous 
functioning does not necessarily mean a faultless operation all the time. The 
system should registrate any errors but its reaction depends upon the 
circumstances whether they can be considered as transient or permanent ones 
and whether they affect all the connected subscribers (about 1000) or only a 
small group of them. 
In the case of a transient fault affecting, for instance, only a single call-
process and between such faults the system operates without malfunction for a 
longer time, it is not necessary to initiate any error recovery action but to make 
a record of it for later analysis. Should a permanent fault occur the scale of 
reaction is to be considered to avoid over-reaction. 
There can be faults, such as e.g. power failures, which occur very rarely 
but may cause serious problems for a longer time. Subunits that can cause such 
acute failures (e.g. power units, clock generators, CPU's) are duplicated and 
continuously monitored for immediate actions. Less senous problems, 
however, require special strategies. 
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Fault detection in the PCM switch 
The possible errors, can be divided into two groups: 
- PCM line faults and 
- PCM switch faults. 
Abnormal functioning in PCM lines are checked by special hardware means 
resulting in interrupt signalling towards the central controller. The cause of the 
error is determined by the CPU polling the line status bytes sequentially. Once 
the faulty PCM line has been found it is eliminated and the system resumes 
normal operation with decreased throughput giving an alarm signal at the 
same time. Abnormal functioning in the PCM switch is detected by a combined 
hardware and software technique. The PCM switch sends back the executed 
switching command to the CPU for validity checking. It is also possible to loop 
back TEST bytes sent by the CPU accross the PCM switch for testing any 
possible interconnections. 
Fault-detection in the Central Controller 
The Central Controller PCC of PRS consists of two independent CUs 
running in a synchronous (dual) mode of operation executing the same 
instructions under normal working conditions and a switch over unit based on 
a single-chip processor. 
To/from Synchronizing .....lI ___ .&-__ ....II-__ --''--__ -''-__ ....... ___ PSN 
PCM ServiCE' Highways 
Fig. 2. Hardware structure of a Control Unit in PCC 
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Each CU has 6 peripherals working to and from a PCM service bus and' 
controlled by the central microprocessor (CPU) via the processor bus (Fig. 2). 
The CPU contains selftesting facilities and it can test the peripherals as welL 
Each control unit has its own power-unit and a triplicated clock generator 
synchronized by the master. The CUs are connected to the switch-over unit by 
means of input/output ports. 
During normal operation one ofthe CUs is the master and the other is the 
slave. Both CUs receive the same messages arriving at the 1st and 2nd service 
bus, respectively. The messages arriving from the PRT and PRA are processed 
independently and synchronously in both CUs working out the required 
commands for the PCM switch, but only those coming from the master are to 
be executed. During synchronous operation the CPU's and the peripherals are 
executing the same operation in every clock cycle but the dual system works as 
if only the master were working. The synchronous operation is checked only at 
the level of sending switching commands towards the PCM switch because this 
is the main task for the Cu. If the command sent out by the slave does not 
comply with that of the master, this indicates an error which is signalized to the 
switch-over unit but the operation is not interrupted unless the switch-over 
unit does not initiate it. In case of a difference, the switch-over unit decides 
whether it was a transient or permanent fault and ifit is a permanent one, which 
of the two CUs should be considered faulty. The necessary additional 





r--- - -.---., 
I Clock Receiver 
Switch-Over 
Interrupts 
~i ~r ~~! z if 
0. ~ 1 u.& ~ I~ ~ ~ J r-u-"~-i r: =-- • -I~ - --~t ~ IT ~r-i g ~ i I:'~ or, "i 11~, I 
ontrollE'r co d; .gl<l--,----___\,. ~ d; ~ Controller 
Processor <Il El E :§ I I .Id E " PrOCE'ssor 
<=={jJus ::J ~;=J;l. .t;l;::E ~us ! CO 8085 ~'-~ I i ~'- ~ 8085 ~.! :; _ )JP --, Ctock ~ 1 Clockll2.-----= P ro ~ 
III ~ Clock I I Synchronizing I .iclock ,., 0 
==i]]~ ~ I I -~ ~F R Q <t -g dS["iPiiV'---'----,------'-i --->.,:-JiPBl<Il \----; C <t El RQ ACK ~ § Hordeore g~ Interpn:xessor Bus~I Hardcore - ~ - ACK 
'" !.£ -'::?NTR?:"::~I~~. ~. _ ~ _ . _. J L . -=~NTR~L~~I~~. ~ . _. _ • _ 
Fig. 3. Connecting paths between Control Units and Switch-Over Unit 
8 cs. CSAPODl el al. 
-1:cSB=Conlrol Unil Slalus Byle 
rCSB=OK :CSB # land CSB"2 ait' correel 
LCSB=NOK:CSBtil0r <:2 reporls aboul 
,..---.1.--...,CSB=NOK failed operalion 
t<t------' -{NOK=Counler for NOK operalions 
Counlerfo OK~OKoperali_ 
ons 
Fig. 4. SDL diagram of simplified switch-over algorithm 
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accumulated knowledge about previous errors. A difference during com-
parison does not necessarily mean a fault in one of the functional units. After 
detecting a number of synchronization errors the first thing is to try to set up 
again the synchronous mode of operation i.e. the master updates the memory 
content of the slave and they try to run again synchronously. Should this 
attempt fail, the switch-over unit initiates a set of test procedures for localizing 
the fault, starting from the self test of the microprocessors. The results are 
reported to the switch-over unit which works out the switch-over command. if 
necessary. 
In case of a definite failure such as a watchdog interrupt caused by the 
master's malfunctioning or by missing clock-signals, an immediate switch-over 
to the slave is initiated. The above mentioned decision making processes are 
outlined in the flow-chart (Fig. 4). 
Fault-detection is also based on extensive software checks intended to 
control the normal handshake signals during call-congestions. The synchron-
ous operation is checked by comparing the commands sent by the master and 
the slave for controlling the PCM switch. 
Checkinq the call-processes 
The call-processes contain a number of different states. input-output 
messages, commands and decisions. They can get from one state to another by 
software subroutines initiated by the input messages. Because of some 
malfunctioning the necessary subroutine is not called in or it runs in an endless 
cycle, the call-process sends a time out signal to the maintenance system which 
can bring the affected call-process to an end making a record of the error at the 
same time. 
Checkinq the synchronous mode (~( operation 
The structure of the PCM switch is such that after having executed the 
commands received by the master it sends back the executed commands to the 
master and the slave for checking purposes. On the other hand it sends back to 
the master the command worked out by the slave as well. In this way both CUs 
can cross-check each other, at the same time they can obtain information about 
the correct operation of the PCM switch. All this data is accessible by the CPUs 
in their own RAM memory and can be tested regularly. The result of this 
software comparison is transmitted to the switch-over unit in the form of a 
status byte from both CUs. 
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The above comparisons only signal about the presence of an error but 
they cannot indicate the faulty unit. Therefore whenever the switch-over unit 
decides on a permanent fault, it suspends the synchronous operation and gives 
command for the self-tests which can locate the faulty unit with a high 
probability. 
Fault handling in the terminal controller 
For the terminal units (PRT) the controller configuration is in principle 
similar to that for PRC. There are two controller microprocessors (type 18085) 
with separate memories, watchdogs etc. with entirely identical configurations. 
Each microprocessor (j.lPA and j.lPB in Fig. 5) has its own bus system, which are 
connected by a bidirectional 2 x 1 byte buffer, in order to provide the 
processors with the possibility of exchanging information. Filling the buffer 
belonging to one direction must always be followed by an interrupt request so 
the other processor turns to the buffer. These IT lines, however, can be masked 
in order to be protected against faulty interrupt requests from the side of a 
processor out of normal operation state. To each processor a peripheral driver 
unit belongs through which the telephone peripherals are controlled. At the 
same time only one such unit is allowed to forward valid commands. There are 
two service receivers (transmitter units, in the case of normal operation, both of 
them transmit the same messages sent by the executing processor), but they 
forward the messages received from PRC separately to the two processors (1 to 
A and 2 to B). PRC gets all information concerning the state of the processors 
through these units. 
The cooperation of the two processors is based on a "partial hot stand by" 
philosophy. This means that both processors are permanently active (except a 
defection), but one of them is taking the role of the master, the other is working 
in a slave mode. The slave's memory contains only a part of the information 
stored in the master. It is expected that switch overs from the master processor 
to the other will be very seldom (except if intentionally, with no fault event), this 
is why it does not seem to be important to save calls in a transient state (as e.g. 
call initiation, dialing) as these will make only a small percentage of the total 
traffic. So if all calls but those in speach state get lost, no serious disturbance in 
the function of the exchange can be detected by the subscribers, i.e. only the 
information concerning calls getting into or out of speach state is transferred to 
the slave processor in PRT. This information modifies as a matter of course, on 
one hand the scan table, on the other it generates a process table artificially that 
is forced directly into the needed state. As the slave has no real contact with any 
peripherals and all time out processes connected with call handling are masked, 
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Fig. 5. Hardware configuration of PRT Controller 
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such processes will never be activated (unless the slave takes the master role). 
This solution provides a very small loss in the case of a defect while the load on 
the master caused by slave messages is negligible. In the defect situation the lost 
calls will be cleaned out of the system by the time out processes in PRC. 
As has been stated, complete updating of the slave is not necessary. This 
does not mean, however, that the slave needs not be tested with an even higher 
intensity than the master. The results of all test processes are periodically 
transmitted to the master, which takes care of their forwarding to PRC. Also 
the master is tested (for test aspects see the next section) and the slave evaluates 
these results. In the case of a faulty or failing test result, the processors send a 
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message to PRC and, parallel, the faulty one takes the role of the slave and 
starts some special tests. If this did not happen, PRC forces the switch over 
through a simple circuit attached to the controller board. 
Finally, it is to be mentioned that at times with no traffic but not more 
frequently than once a day a switch over without defed and loss is completed. 
Diagnostic software components 
In this section, an overview will be given, concerning the most important 
software blocks contained in the PRS system without any division according to 
the hardware units, for diagnostic software has been designed being potentially 
uniform in both PRC and PRT. 
In general, fault detecting and diagnostic software in PRS consists of two 
areas: tests of the control system (microprocessors and additional circuitry as 
e.g. watchdogs) and of the peripherals (including also the communication 
channels). As the latter is much more determined by the hardware design of the 
specific switching equipment and as it is not typical for a usual microprocessor 
controlled communication system, only the test of the control system will be 
dealt with. 
The test philosophy is based on the following considerations. In a 
complex system, there must be dozens or even hundreds of fault types. These 
fault types, however, never appear in a pure form, they rather cause different 
secondary effects which often have not got an unambiguous connection with 
the original fault. By test programs, as a matter of fact, only some effects can be 
detected, the first time only one or a few of all belonging to the fault situation. 
So, if the software detects any fault effect, immediately the most thorough 
possible examination of the concerned system part must be realized. When 
ha ving a complete image of the state of the system the assumed fault types are 
ordered into a decreasing probability sequence. This principle is much more 
difficult to follow if two or more faults are allowed to exist parallel to each 
other, in the fault detection strategy used in PRS, it is supposed however, that 
all defects will be diagnosticized in a relatively short time after their occurrence, 
as the probability of another fault appearing before completing the diagnosis is 
very small. 
In the former section, the watchdogs belonging to each processor have 
been mentioned. The operational system of each processor is due to send life 
signs permanently to the watchdog. The allowed time interval between two 
such signs has a certain tolerance, but it is limited from both directions; too 
early or too late pulses effect in a hardware alarm from the side of the watchdog 
REMOTE PCM SWITCfIING SYSTEM 13 
(see Fig. 6), i.e. in the case of a sign of life missing the window of the watchdog 
requests an interrupt. As a direct result of a short self-test procedure begins 
inside the board containing the controllers. This check involves a check of the 
important control signals and the PROM-s as well as a simple functional test of 
the RAM. If no fault has been determined a guess is made concerning the faulty 
hardware alarm 
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Fiq. 6. Time diagram of a double watchdog 
program or data area to which the register contents are used. According to the 
software structure of the system, the following characteristics are tested: 
~- all PROM-s (by control sums). 
- all RAM-s, 
the stack pointer (validity check), 
-- all data connected with the area (validity), 
clear areas or words (contaminating data check), 
- pointers (forward and backward) of all chained records referred to in 
the area. 
If no faulty component has been detected, the fault will be handled, if pos-
sible at all, as a transient defect. If, however, a positive result has been gained, 
the contaminated area will be tried to be cleaned by eliminating all connected 
processes. This means, on one hand, some clearings in the RAM and. on the 
other hand, the generation of certain messages. If elimination is impossible a 
direct message to operator will be sent out (as e.g. asking for the exchange of a 
board). 
Transient faults mentioned earlier will be registered in software counters 
(each belonging to one type of fault and one board). Should a defect occur that 
cannot be reproduced, the corresponding counter is incremented. In order to 
eliminate the long time registration of transient faults caused by some 
occasional outside effects the counters are decremented if a long time has 
passed without an incrementation (except counters having zero value). If the 
counter, however. reaches a critical point, the fault will be considered as a 
permanent one and the fault message will be sent out accordingly to it. In the 
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case of certain fault types a middle value is set to where no outside fault message 
belongs to but test intensity will be enlarged. 
There are also routine test processes which are activated only seldom by 
the scheduler if there is no special reason but which get a higher priority if e.g. a 
counter has reached its middle critical value, or there is any hint to some hidden 
fault. Some examples for such processes are complete pointer checks in chained 
records, complete validity and contaminating data checks, control byte checks 
in different tables, stack pointer chec.ks and complete RAM tests. 
Among these routine test processes a central part is played by the 
watchdog test which is carried out with a masked watchdog alarm. This is 
necessary in order to prevent a double fault occurring when a defective 
watchdog cannot detect a processor or software fault. 
Finally, one of the most important test software blocks must be 
mentioned: these are "dummy" call processes checking through the whole call-
handling system. 
As it has been pointed out at the beginning of the section, there is another 
part of the diagnostic software concerning the peripherals, but there is no 
possibility here to deal with these problems. 
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